Is the decline of the West inevitable?

[Icarus]

I remember Paul Kennedy once commenting on the controversy caused by his Rise and Fall of the Great Powers that it seemed unusual to him that to say Great Powers tended to rise and fall should be seen as being in any way either controversial or particularly original.

On a long enough time-frame certainly the 'West', however we wish to define it, will decline, judging by whatever index of measurement we choose to measure it by. And so surely will whatever supplants it. It's a fact that's been recognized and been an element of human thought since antiquity, and surely it's something that will continue in some form or another for the foreseeable future.

That is, unless anyone out there has any ideas on how to 'solve' history, international relations, or to wear my classical realist hat for a moment, human nature. Fukuyama, I'm looking at you....

[Hennessy]

Fukuyama, I'm looking at you....

Right back at ya sucker

[jollytiddlywink]

OK, working through your posts, these are my main issues. The idea that the modern state is inextricably linked with genocide (NB this to me implies that if you have one you're going to have the other--> intextricable: impossible to disentangle- but for clarity, I'm going to assume a correlation) and total war comes down to a question of scale and not intent. Previously, there simply weren't millions of people and the techological capacity to do so. But the driving issues behind genocide - territory and race - they're still there in historical conflicts. So, given a state and a non-state with the same technology and the same population, would they act differently? I mean, I can see where you're coming from. A strong state provides the infrastructure for an efficient extermination, but . . . I'm not convinved that there's necessarily any causation, just because it's a state.

If you consider that people with disabilities and gay men were also killed in the Holocaust - that wasn't the first systematic attempt, there's a history of persecution and execution there. When you think of the missing women in some countries today, due to the preferential abortion of female children, that's a cultural rather than a state issue . . .

Also, I'm not clear on what a non-state is. If a state is territory occupied by a nation, then that's an almost all-encompassing group. Is a non-state nomadism? As a basis of comparison, non-state and states seem to be a very uneven grouping. Arguably genocides are often associated with historic conflicts that exist within a newly forming state (this would apply to modern states forming post-colonialism). But, I'm not an expert, so if you have research proving otherwise, OK.

As I said already, "genocide is inextricably linked with the modern state, but that doesn't imply that the reverse is also true." In other words, genocide cannot exist without the modern state, but the modern state can exist without genocide. You've flipped it round ("The idea that the modern state is inextricably linked with genocide...") and thus reversed the relationship.
To work through your post point-by-point: First, I must insist that a total war is absolutely a matter of both intent and scale, not merely of scale. Total wars are markedly different in intent from limited wars, or indeed from plain-old 'wars.' Total war tends towards a war of annihilation: the Eastern Front 1941-45 is the supreme example of this, but the bombing of civilians during that war, the use of blockade and unrestricted submarine warfare are all manifestations of intent: to bring down an entire society, not merely to defeat armed forces in the field.

A non-state (leaving aside the Clausewitzian definition which by default bars non-states from 'warfare') cannot fight a war, let alone a total war. It is something that simply could not be undertaken, sustained or organised by any other organisational entity. Speaking as a military historian of the 20th century, total war is impossible without a state.
Given historical reality, I cannot provide a non-state counter-example to compare to genocidal states, but I can point out that genocide did not occur before modern states appeared. Yes, there is no end of violence and ethnic cleansing that could be pointed out in history, but that was not genocide. And even those episodes of cleansing which did occur were both more sporadic and often milder than what occurred in the 20th century, and the latter part of the 19th century. An example of non-modern states, rather than non-states.

Yes, there are groups of people (like Communists, 'anti-social elements', homosexuals, Freemasons) who were also victims of Nazi attempts to exterminate them, but for terminological clarity, I will insist that this, while it is a form of extremely violent cleansing, isn't genocide, because it is not racially/ethnically defined. I think there is probably a stronger history of anti-Semitism than a history of, to use your examples, gay-bashing or violence against the disabled. But while anti-Semitism has a very long history, the Holocaust was the first time anybody had attempted to kill every Jew in the world. The history of anti-Semitism was horrid, certainly, but it was confined to, at most, regional violence, often aimed at making Jews move elsewhere, convert, or otherwise assimilate. Yes, Jews were killed, sometimes in large numbers, but never until the 1930s and 40s did anyone attempt to kill every Jew in an entire country, let alone across a continent or world-wide.

A non-state is difficult... its basically a group of people in a territory without any clear borders, and without any over-arching government recognised internally and externally as the political authority of that piece of land. Don't confuse a nation of people on a bit of land with a state... nations and states often don't match up (Kurds, Armenians, etc). The state is all about territory and government, and only involves a nation if it is a 'nation-state' which is a different kettle of fish.

[jollytiddlywink]

I remember Paul Kennedy once commenting on the controversy caused by his Rise and Fall of the Great Powers that it seemed unusual to him that to say Great Powers tended to rise and fall should be seen as being in any way either controversial or particularly original.

On a long enough time-frame certainly the 'West', however we wish to define it, will decline, judging by whatever index of measurement we choose to measure it by. And so surely will whatever supplants it. It's a fact that's been recognized and been an element of human thought since antiquity, and surely it's something that will continue in some form or another for the foreseeable future.

That is, unless anyone out there has any ideas on how to 'solve' history, international relations, or to wear my classical realist hat for a moment, human nature. Fukuyama, I'm looking at you....

A very timely piece of wisdom. Every power rises, enjoys its time (short or long) on the world stage, and then slips away again. Sometimes powers manage to hang on a long time, for various reasons, sometimes because they simply refuse to go.
But I'm slightly dis-satisfied with this annales school view of things... far enough back, all historical problems just become details. Of course the West will decline eventually, but is it going to decline in five years? Is it in decline now, and if so, it is terminal? Is the west in relative or absolute decline?

And, to lob one more grenade into this, IF the west is in decline, who is in the ascendant, and who is going to replace the west?

[LonelyPilgrim]

As I said already, "genocide is inextricably linked with the modern state, but that doesn't imply that the reverse is also true." In other words, genocide cannot exist without the modern state, but the modern state can exist without genocide. You've flipped it round ("The idea that the modern state is inextricably linked with genocide...") and thus reversed the relationship.
To work through your post point-by-point: First, I must insist that a total war is absolutely a matter of both intent and scale, not merely of scale. Total wars are markedly different in intent from limited wars, or indeed from plain-old 'wars.' Total war tends towards a war of annihilation: the Eastern Front 1941-45 is the supreme example of this, but the bombing of civilians during that war, the use of blockade and unrestricted submarine warfare are all manifestations of intent: to bring down an entire society, not merely to defeat armed forces in the field.

Whoa... you don't need a state to have 'total war'. Look at the Mongol expansion. Look at Rome's response to the Punic Wars (and the concurrent Macedonian Wars). The Mongols were not a state and neither was Rome (in the modern sense) and yet their entire populations were mobilised at times to support a war effort - the very definition of a 'total war'.

A non-state (leaving aside the Clausewitzian definition which by default bars non-states from 'warfare') cannot fight a war, let alone a total war. It is something that simply could not be undertaken, sustained or organised by any other organisational entity. Speaking as a military historian of the 20th century, total war is impossible without a state.
Given historical reality, I cannot provide a non-state counter-example to compare to genocidal states, but I can point out that genocide did not occur before modern states appeared. Yes, there is no end of violence and ethnic cleansing that could be pointed out in history, but that was not genocide. And even those episodes of cleansing which did occur were both more sporadic and often milder than what occurred in the 20th century, and the latter part of the 19th century. An example of non-modern states, rather than non-states.

As an ancient historian, let me counter again - Rome's destruction of Carthage, or the destruction of Corinth which occurred in the same year, were examples of the complete annihilation of a competing political entity, the men slaughtered and the women and children reduced to slavery. The same was often carried out on entire tribes, hundreds of thousands of people, during Caesar's Gallic Wars. There was nothing 'mild' or 'sporadic' about the entire Punic or Corinthian citizenry being wiped off the page of history.

Further, since you previously restricted your preferred definition of 'state' to post-1900, how do you account for the US Indian Wars? Or going further back, the Albigensian Crusade in medieval France? What about the forced conversion of the Moors in Spain, and then there subsequent persecution under the Inquisition?

And Clausewitz, who was one of the most brilliant military thinkers of any era, wasn't infallible. Non-states can and do wage war... or was there no war prior to your birth of the state? Did Napoleon crush Prince Ludwig of Hohenlohe in a game of rugby played with bullets, then? There is a whole literature out there on the changing nature of war and how it doesn't fit Clausewitz's definition. You see, he wrote about war between states - one type of war, and the type he was most familiar with as a Prussian officer. There are other variations on the theme - war isn't always an extension of politics, sometimes it's an extension of economics - consider the Celtic raiding of antiquity, which could entail the efforts of several hundred thousand men - or Rome's expansion fuelled by the need for land and slaves. War is only political when you accept the legitimate political existence of the other side and that just didn't happen often before 1648 - are we then to not consider conflicts before that date as wars? I hardly think so.

Yes, there are groups of people (like Communists, 'anti-social elements', homosexuals, Freemasons) who were also victims of Nazi attempts to exterminate them, but for terminological clarity, I will insist that this, while it is a form of extremely violent cleansing, isn't genocide, because it is not racially/ethnically defined.

Your definition of genocide is waaaaaaay too restrictive. Where are you drawing it from? Genocide is defined by the 1948 Genocide Convention and it is NOT coterminous with mass murder. It can include mass deportations, forced resettlement, and deliberately induced starvation. Further there is no racial criteria, mass murder counts provided it is conducted on the basis of some previously selected criteria - the actual criteria can be anything, but it has to be pre-meditated and defined.

A non-state is difficult... its basically a group of people in a territory without any clear borders, and without any over-arching government recognised internally and externally as the political authority of that piece of land. Don't confuse a nation of people on a bit of land with a state... nations and states often don't match up (Kurds, Armenians, etc). The state is all about territory and government, and only involves a nation if it is a 'nation-state' which is a different kettle of fish.

While I applaud your recognition of the difference between state and nation - defining the 'state' is still a point of serious contention IR and Political Science. There is no consensus on what separates a state from an empire, for example. Some points are generally agreed upon, though:

1. Control of territory by a government.
2. Claim to absolute control over the use of force within defined borders.
3. Recognition of self as a legal entity within an international system of like political units.

Thus, empires are not states, since they usually see their own political claims as superior to the claims of other political entities, and they often contain units within themselves that retain autonomy over the internal use of force and rule of local law. I, personally, would argue that the modern state also requires a concept of citizenship as distinct from subjecthood, but that's just my personal opinion.

Ultimately, you are narrowing your terms down to the point that you are defining your argument as unimpeachable. Unfortunately for your case, genocide is a recognised term in international law and it is widely recognised that Clausewitz's definition of war was too restrictive to fit reality outside of 19th century Europe. Your case is good in theory, but when faced with reality, like much theory, it doesn't fit well.

[the Empress]

I did invert your genocide-state JTW, I hadn't noticed, but I do think it's worth teasing these ideas out.

JTW '[/quote]'Total wars are markedly different in intent from limited wars, or indeed from plain-old 'wars.' Total war tends towards a war of annihilation: the Eastern Front 1941-45 is the supreme example of this, but the bombing of civilians during that war, the use of blockade and unrestricted submarine warfare are all manifestations of intent: to bring down an entire society, not merely to defeat armed forces in the field.[/quote]

Immediately I thought of Easter Island, in which total war was waged 1724-1750 (even those villagers who weren't directly effected still sought refuge, and in 1770 most Islanders were still living in underground caves with narrow entrances). (NB: Interestingly I found some arguments suggesting that a colonial genocide of Islanders [also] later occured; there's controversy over this source however]. There's also this Wikipedia article: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_war which provides references for pre-20C total warfare. This Wikipedia article: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genocides_in_history suggests that genocide scholarship is inclusive of pre-20C events, even excluding disease issues which complicate the Americas mass population decline.

JTW '[/quote] I think there is probably a stronger history of anti-Semitism than a history of, to use your examples, gay-bashing or violence against the disabled. But while anti-Semitism has a very long history, the Holocaust was the first time anybody had attempted to kill every Jew in the world.[/quote]'

I think sexuality and disability are neglected in terms of historical scholarship generally. In terms of the Holocaust, I think it's important to consider every group victimised, it informs the nature of the event, and the motivations behind it. Please note that I'm not denying the anti-semitic nature nor the serious of the Holocaust.

JTW '[/quote]A non-state is difficult... its basically a group of people in a territory without any clear borders, and without any over-arching government recognised internally and externally as the political authority of that piece of land. Don't confuse a nation of people on a bit of land with a state... nations and states often don't match up (Kurds, Armenians, etc). The state is all about territory and government, and only involves a nation if it is a 'nation-state' which is a different kettle of fish.[/quote]

I was defining a nation as: people who share a real or imagined common history, culture, language or ethnic origin, who typically inhabit a particular country or territory . . . but even considering tribalism and nomadism, I don't seen an incapacity for war.

[LonelyPilgrim]

I second the Empress.

Empress, what do/did you study?

[the Empress]

lol, it's complicated - 2 years Scottish & Modern History, 3 years Sustainable Development and currently finishing an MSc Environmental Resource Assessment. I suspect I'm unemployable . . . I have a passion for history though (I'd totally revamp the way history is taught in schools if I could), which is hard to work into a conversation! Hence I jump on these threads . . . . . Did you study philosphy or IR?

[jollytiddlywink]

Whoa... you don't need a state to have 'total war'. Look at the Mongol expansion. Look at Rome's response to the Punic Wars (and the concurrent Macedonian Wars). The Mongols were not a state and neither was Rome (in the modern sense) and yet their entire populations were mobilised at times to support a war effort - the very definition of a 'total war'.

You DO need a state to have a total war. The Mongols and Rome were both political entities (albeit very dis-similar ones), with a recognised government or central ruler, and a more or less clearly defined or at least commonly recognised chain of command, and a means of raising and commanding an army. This is stretching the definition of 'a state' somewhat, but clearly they are both closer to the idea of a state than to anything we could properly call 'non-state.'

As an ancient historian, let me counter again - Rome's destruction of Carthage, or the destruction of Corinth which occurred in the same year, were examples of the complete annihilation of a competing political entity, the men slaughtered and the women and children reduced to slavery. The same was often carried out on entire tribes, hundreds of thousands of people, during Caesar's Gallic Wars. There was nothing 'mild' or 'sporadic' about the entire Punic or Corinthian citizenry being wiped off the page of history.

Further, since you previously restricted your preferred definition of 'state' to post-1900, how do you account for the US Indian Wars? Or going further back, the Albigensian Crusade in medieval France? What about the forced conversion of the Moors in Spain, and then there subsequent persecution under the Inquisition?

And Clausewitz, who was one of the most brilliant military thinkers of any era, wasn't infallible. Non-states can and do wage war... or was there no war prior to your birth of the state? Did Napoleon crush Prince Ludwig of Hohenlohe in a game of rugby played with bullets, then? There is a whole literature out there on the changing nature of war and how it doesn't fit Clausewitz's definition. You see, he wrote about war between states - one type of war, and the type he was most familiar with as a Prussian officer. There are other variations on the theme - war isn't always an extension of politics, sometimes it's an extension of economics - consider the Celtic raiding of antiquity, which could entail the efforts of several hundred thousand men - or Rome's expansion fuelled by the need for land and slaves. War is only political when you accept the legitimate political existence of the other side and that just didn't happen often before 1648 - are we then to not consider conflicts before that date as wars? I hardly think so.

Rome fighting Carthage, and other similar campaigns, yes, do exhibit aspects of total warfare, much like the Boer War, the Napoleonic War, and the US Civil War exhibit aspects of total war. But these earlier wars are all lacking other facets of total warfare which disqualify them. Highlighting one point of similarity doesn't prove that two wars are the same, merely that they share a point of similarity.
I didn't say that violence pre 19th century was ALWAYS mild or sporadic, merely that it tended to be more mild and sporadic than the 19th and 20th C. Likewise, I did not confine 'a state' to post-1900. I confined a modern state to post-1789 or to post-1900. Clearly there were early-modern precursors to modern states.
Neither did I say I believed in Clausewitz's constrictive definition of war. In fact, I specifically said I was ignoring it. I was pointing out that to raise, equip, sustain and direct an army requires a state (loosely defined as a political entity, like a kingdom, an empire... some form of government over a territory, etc.), and that to wage a total war requires a modern state. War is something that can be traced back as far as human history can be traced back, so of course I am not suggesting that wars didn't occur pre-1640s or pre-1900s.
I am, thank you very much, well aware of both Clausewitz's writings and the criticisms thereof. The case I found most interesting was that put by Keegan, that war very often has cultural implications which over-ride any other concerns, including politics.

Regarding the US Indian Wars, I cannot claim any particularly detailed knowledge, but the fact that the wars were numerous, often small-scale (involving a few tribes at a time out of hundreds), sporadic, and often involved other tribes fighting their traditional enemies (Iroquois/Mohawks, etc), and lasted over roughly 250 years, suggests that this isn't genocide. The story isn't a simple one, and regardless of everything else, the vast majority of dead indigenous tribes were killed off by European diseases unwittingly brought over by the first European settlers. Mass death, certainly, but not a genocide. How else to explain the alliances the British and French had with tribes, or that the US government and the CSA government had with tribes 1861-65, or indeed the continuing survival of numerous small and defenceless reservations within US jurisdiction?
The religious examples you invoke--the crusade and the Reconquista, are ones which are brought up in literature on the subject of ideology in 20th century political violence. Yes, people killed and died for ideology before 1900. But if you are seeking religious purity, often violence is applied to force people to convert. Once they have converted (sincerely or otherwise), they are more or less assimilated, and violence tends to diminish. The absolutes of the 20th century, and the shift to ethnic and racial definitions of 'the other,' which people can neither secretly practice nor convert from, shifted the nature of the fight between 'the people' and 'the other.'

Your definition of total war as involving the mobilisation of their entire populations to support a war effort is at best partial, and also suspect. Can you provide any evidence, statistical or otherwise, to indicate that large numbers of the Roman population were diverted from one occupation to another to support the war, or were otherwise made to serve the war effort? The mobilisation of a population is only part of the definition of total war.
Other elements of total war (such as are commonly agreed upon in the literature) are:
-a state (ie political entity) capable of considerable and sustained resource extraction (labour, manpower, industry, raw materials, taxes, loans and other sources of funding)
-persistent rather than episodic warfare (in other words, forces in constant contact and combat with an enemy. A battle lasting one day, like Waterloo, is episodic. A battle lasting 8 months, like Verdun, is persistent)
-actions directed against an entire state or people, not just against armed forces. A breakdown of the soldier/civilian divide
-total war is undertaken by industrialised mass societies
-total war is fought literally to the death, not of individual combatants, but to the death of one or other of the combatant powers
-total war often (though not always) involves modern ideological elements, like the Nazi/Communist divide, or the wider Nazi/democratic divide of WWII, or the democracy/Kaiser and kultur divide of WWI.

Yes, there are groups of people (like Communists, 'anti-social elements', homosexuals, Freemasons) who were also victims of Nazi attempts to exterminate them, but for terminological clarity, I will insist that this, while it is a form of extremely violent cleansing, isn't genocide, because it is not racially/ethnically defined.

Your definition of genocide is waaaaaaay too restrictive. Where are you drawing it from? Genocide is defined by the 1948 Genocide Convention and it is NOT coterminous with mass murder. It can include mass deportations, forced resettlement, and deliberately induced starvation. Further there is no racial criteria, mass murder counts provided it is conducted on the basis of some previously selected criteria - the actual criteria can be anything, but it has to be pre-meditated and defined.

A non-state is difficult... its basically a group of people in a territory without any clear borders, and without any over-arching government recognised internally and externally as the political authority of that piece of land. Don't confuse a nation of people on a bit of land with a state... nations and states often don't match up (Kurds, Armenians, etc). The state is all about territory and government, and only involves a nation if it is a 'nation-state' which is a different kettle of fish.

While I applaud your recognition of the difference between state and nation - defining the 'state' is still a point of serious contention IR and Political Science. There is no consensus on what separates a state from an empire, for example. Some points are generally agreed upon, though:

1. Control of territory by a government.
2. Claim to absolute control over the use of force within defined borders.
3. Recognition of self as a legal entity within an international system of like political units.

Thus, empires are not states, since they usually see their own political claims as superior to the claims of other political entities, and they often contain units within themselves that retain autonomy over the internal use of force and rule of local law. I, personally, would argue that the modern state also requires a concept of citizenship as distinct from subjecthood, but that's just my personal opinion.

Ultimately, you are narrowing your terms down to the point that you are defining your argument as unimpeachable. Unfortunately for your case, genocide is a recognised term in international law and it is widely recognised that Clausewitz's definition of war was too restrictive to fit reality outside of 19th century Europe. Your case is good in theory, but when faced with reality, like much theory, it doesn't fit well.[/quote]

My definition of genocide is precisely that--mine, based on the roots of geno (people or race) and cide, the killing thereof. While the 1948 convention does not make genocide conterminous with mass murder, the historical literature does (anything less than killing would fall into 'cleansing'). Moreover, the 1948 convention does indeed define genocide as pertaining to "a national, ethnical, racial or religious group"... clearly the criteria cannot be 'anything' as you said. Genocide, by the international legal definition, can't be perpetrated on just anyone: genocide can't be perpetrated on Communists or homosexuals, although they also undeniably suffered and died under the Nazi regime, too, alongside groups that were ethnically or religiously defined.
I can't see anything wrong with my definition of genocide... fortunately for my case, it does in fact correspond very closely with the international legal definition which you mentioned, which undermines your suggestion that my definition was somehow invalid. I have already addressed your mistaken belief that I was adhering to Clausewitzian ideas about the political nature of warfare (which does, in any case, break down beyond repair in total war).

I'm perfectly happy to accept your definition of the state: I was trying to distinguish between a state and a non-state, in response to one of Empress' posts asking what a 'non-state' is.

[the Empress]

The absolutes of the 20th century, and the shift to ethnic and racial definitions of 'the other,' which people can neither secretly practice nor convert from, shifted the nature of the fight between 'the people' and 'the other.'

I've already set out my critiques for your arguments . . . so I'll only address the above, which is wrong. 'The other' has many times been defined racially/ethnically outwith the 20C -> check out human historical geography literature.

[the Empress]

Other elements of total war (such as are commonly agreed upon in the literature) are:
-a state (ie political entity) capable of considerable and sustained resource extraction (labour, manpower, industry, raw materials, taxes, loans and other sources of funding)

Looking through this thread again (I have work due), the above struck me - that's a really recursive definition you've got going there . . considering you're attempting to prove that only state's can engage in total warfare.

[jollytiddlywink]

I did invert your genocide-state JTW, I hadn't noticed, but I do think it's worth teasing these ideas out.

Immediately I thought of Easter Island, in which total war was waged 1724-1750 (even those villagers who weren't directly effected still sought refuge, and in 1770 most Islanders were still living in underground caves with narrow entrances). (NB: Interestingly I found some arguments suggesting that a colonial genocide of Islanders [also] later occured; there's controversy over this source however]. There's also this Wikipedia article: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_war which provides references for pre-20C total warfare. This Wikipedia article: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genocides_in_history suggests that genocide scholarship is inclusive of pre-20C events, even excluding disease issues which complicate the Americas mass population decline.

It might, at this point, serve us well to step back and recall that we are having this argument about genocide because LonelyPilgrim suggested that states have spared people from violent excesses, and I put the counter-point that the reverse is actually true. So, for that point to stand, it isn't necessary for me to prove that no genocide ever took place before the modern state, but merely that it occurs more often and more widely in the modern era... but to address your points. Genocide scholarship is indeed inclusive of pre-1900 events, although as the wiki article you cited says, it is a subject laden with controversy. Moreover, one of the scholars cited in the article says, "Genocide is a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group so defined by the perpetrator." So we do indeed have a definition of genocide which intimately involves the state (but that concerns LP more than you). Regarding possible colonial genocide on Easter Island, I must plead ignorance of that case. I won't therefore attempt to answer you, and I'll leave that point to stand.

I must, I'm afraid (because of its rather excessive length) refer you to my last post to LP concerning the central points of a total war. In short, some strands of total warfare are evident well before the 20th century, because as with almost everything in history, there are elements of continuity. But achieving all the facets of total war is still something that needed to wait for the 20th century in Europe.

[/quote]I think sexuality and disability are neglected in terms of historical scholarship generally. In terms of the Holocaust, I think it's important to consider every group victimised, it informs the nature of the event, and the motivations behind it. Please note that I'm not denying the anti-semitic nature nor the serious of the Holocaust.[/quote]

I entirely agree that studies of sexuality and disability are neglected areas of historical study. Of course we must not write off any victims of Nazi persecution and violence, but the problem is applying the specific term 'genocide' to groups that aren't ethnically, racially or religiously defined, which does, as you point out, exclude a large number of victims. The point I am trying to make, I hope clearly, is that not all victims of Nazi persecution were victims of a genocide, because not all victims were chosen on racial or religious grounds. This is in no way an effort to diminish the suffering and deaths of the Holocaust, but an attempt to adhere to the narrowly legalistic (and the etymological) definition of a genocide (again, see my reply to Lonely above).

[/quote]I was defining a nation as: people who share a real or imagined common history, culture, language or ethnic origin, who typically inhabit a particular country or territory . . . but even considering tribalism and nomadism, I don't seen an incapacity for war.[/quote]

I don't see an incapacity for war in tribal or nomadic peoples, either. Like all other human groups, tribes and nomads fight. But tribes and nomads don't have the capacity to make any really destructive weaponry (battleships, bombers, machine guns, ICBMs), and are almost completely incapable of using them, or of using them for any length of time without outside support (think US supplies of weapons, and (crucially) ammunition to the Mujahadeen, or the trade in muskets to Native American tribes, etc). They could use such weapons, and were very good at doing so, but they could neither make them or supply them on their own. The social organisation, the political legitimacy, the 'staying power' of tribes and nomads are all entirely lacking compared to even quite basic states. Tribes and nomads can and do have wars, but they cannot have total wars... those require states, and modern states (and societies) at that. Tribes and nomads often have highly ritualised combat which is wildly different from total war. Ritualised combat is something you may have encountered if you are mentioning literature on human historical geography (which is another area where I must plead ignorance, although it is something I can approach through the narrow window of warfare).

Re: your point on the 'other' being ethnically defined outwith the 20th C, I will again defer to your knowledge in that field. I was not clear, I'm afraid. I wasn't trying to suggest that 'the other' only took on ethnic/racial connotations in the 20th c, but rather that non-ethnic definitions of the other (like religious ones) were less common, which tended to eliminate ways for the other to assimilate. Catholics could assimilate by converting to Protestantism (or visa versa, as happened a lot in Reformation Europe), but Jews could never 'convert' to being Aryan, as far as the Nazis were concerned. That was my contention.

[jollytiddlywink]

Other elements of total war (such as are commonly agreed upon in the literature) are:
-a state (ie political entity) capable of considerable and sustained resource extraction (labour, manpower, industry, raw materials, taxes, loans and other sources of funding)

Looking through this thread again (I have work due), the above struck me - that's a really recursive definition you've got going there . . considering you're attempting to prove that only state's can engage in total warfare.

Fair point. Widen it out then:
-any power hierarchy capable of considerable and sustained resource extraction (labour, manpower, industry, raw materials, taxes, loans and other sources of funding)

If anyone can provide a good example when a non-state meets these criteria, I'd be very interested, because as far as I am aware, only states do so.

[the Empress]

the definition struck me, but most of my posts regard non-modern states which is what I thought we were largely arguing about (as thinking non-states seem to be a conceptual nightmare). . . . although, non-states can clearly engage in *warfare* which I think was in debate a few posts ago.

[jollytiddlywink]

the definition struck me, but most of my posts regard non-modern states which is what I thought we were largely arguing about (as thinking non-states seem to be a conceptual nightmare). . . . although, non-states can clearly engage in *warfare* which I think was in debate a few posts ago.

To be honest, I sometimes have trouble remembering *exactly* what the argument is about on these long-running forums... this one is about the decline of the West, who knew?
Non-modern states fight wars, but only modern states can fight total wars: my argument at its most basic.
Non-states, be they tribes or otherwise, certainly fight, but I am not entirely satisfied that something which is in no way a 'political entity' (as distinct from a state, which is a particular kind of political entity) can wage war. It is, as you say, a conceptual nightmare, because it is all theory, and the historian in me cries out for examples and evidence! But, my larger point, answering LP, is that modern states wage total war and that modern states and modernity are closely tied up with both total wars and genocides and plenty of other violence besides, and that therefore his suggestion that states have spared people from any kind of violent excess is wrong.

[LonelyPilgrim]

I might reply in more detail later, maybe... my last post already resulted in me being late to an important meeting, I really should focus on real world arguments in *gasp* real life.

That said, I *never* suggested that states spare people from excessive violence. My points can be summed up as:

1. States, from 1648 - ~1900, provided more peace and security in Europe than the preceding feudal system based on the idea of a religious republic of Europe - the respublica Christiana.

2. The state system is *not* conducive to peace and security in the modern world - since the concept of sovereignty coupled with the post-WWII global economic system makes civil strife and autogenocide easy and frequent within the developing world (or, more precisely, in that part of the developing world which is failing to develop). *ON THIS POINT WE ALMOST AGREE* - only I lay most of the blame at the feet of the current global economic system making it extremely difficult for developing states to alleviate the suffering that spawns civil strife and insecurity (particular global currency exchange regulations - or the lack of them). The state itself (or something *like* a state) may make genocide possible, and be a pre-condition, but I reject your idea that there is a causal link: states do not automatically = genocide. The cause is something else, the state merely enables. That said, the legal idea of the state as sovereign makes it difficult for outside actors to take steps to prevent or end internal conflict and autogenocide - both in a legal and in a normative sense.

3. Collapses of international systems are bloody business. The end result may be a better system than what came before: the Westphalian State System has certainly been better for the mass of humanity than the old respublica Christiana, for example, but the population of Central Europe that died during the 30 Years' War isn't likely to agree. Likewise, I feel that we are living in a period of transition where the Westphalian system is slowly giving way to something that might look a lot like it at first, but instead of sovereignty bases itself on humanitarian principle. Any such change will be resisted, and will only succeed as a result of widespread violence and collapse in much of the developing world. I expect more Somalias and more DRCs and more Darfurs in the decades ahead. I hate to say it, but my future employment rather depends upon it, although I'd gladly look for other work if I'm wrong.

Appendix 1. It's also worth noting, that WWII was as nasty as it was because it was a *challenge* to the current system - an attempt to replace a system based on sovereignty with one based on racial purity, ie. a form of empire. As such, WWII did not occur 'within' the international state system, but was rather an unsuccessful assault upon it.

Appendix 2. The Westphalian system has served it's time. Insofar as I appreciate it, and do not share your dislike, it's because it did what it was meant to do and was undeniably better than what preceded it. Now it has outlived its usefulness and has transitioned into being part of the problem rather than the solution.

Appendix 3. Rome was never a state. It was a race-based empire which gradually transitioned into a universalist civilisation - but it never stopped being an empire. A look at its relations with sub-units both within and without its limes will make that clear: it was never a united single polity with one legal code throughout its territory (at least not until Justinian reformed the law code, but the Western Empire had fallen by then) but was rather a core polity relating to a wide variety of varying peripheral polities with a staggering array of statuses and agreements and levels of control.

[jollytiddlywink]

I suppose I should address the original question: Throw Huntington away, events have overcome his theory. He is far too optimistic. Western civilisation is in decline - at least relatively, possibly absolutely - but it doesn't matter. The international system, based upon state sovereignty, which has protected the world from the worst excesses of anarchy for the last 360 years is collapsing under the twin assaults of pre-emptive war and humanitarian intervention. Whether it is replaced by a system as robust or whether the result is chaos and the breakdown of international law remains to be seen. What I'm certain of is that we are living in a time of fundamental transition in the way states relate to each other and to international institutions such as the UN or the IMF and World Bank and trying to judge who will come out top, if anyone, is virtually impossible while the old system is still in the process of collapse. The West might weather changes better... but then again the modifications made to the old system post-1945 were designed to the West's extreme benefit, and if those supports are stripped away and you get international financial system reform into something more just, for example, the West might not be adaptive enough to avoid serious economic issues that make the current recession look like a mild overcast day. Time will tell.

As you said, you never suggested (explicitly) that states spare people from excessive violence, but I would have thought that violence and 'the worst excesses of anarchy' were more or less synonymous. My counter-point was to address the strong links between total war, genocide, and the modern state, and either to suggest that thus states didn't spare people from violence, or that states as an alternative to 'anarchy' are not as straight-forwardly preferable as people might think.
That said, I accept your point, and I'll move on to pick other bones.
"The state itself (or something *like* a state) may make genocide possible, and be a pre-condition, but I reject your idea that there is a causal link: states do not automatically = genocide"
I didn't say that states have a causal link, and certainly didn't say or imply that states automatically equal genocide. This is an argument I have already had with Empress, but to reiterate: genocide is something undertaken by states. Not all states undertake genocide. I earlier wrote: "genocide is inextricably linked with the modern state, but that doesn't imply that the reverse is also true." In other words, genocide cannot exist without the modern state, but the modern state can exist without genocide.

I must take issue with your idea that the Westphalian system is in collapse, or at least with your evidence of the increasing level of pre-emptive war and humanitarian intervention. First, states (or empires) have been waging pre-emptive wars throughout the period (1648-2000) in question, and that doesn't seem to have toppled the system. The British assault on Copenhagen is but one example of a pre-emptive attack, an example which could be multiplied many hundreds of times, for the British Empire alone. To take a different case, the US sent troops to Haiti 16 times between 1900 and 1913, and did much the same in a dozen other countries in that part of the world, and continued to do so right through to the 1980s.
Secondly, I think that humanitarian intervention has some rather long, if tenuous roots. The British effort to impose an international moratorium on the slave-trade might qualify as an example, with British vessels not being too particular about whose ships they were stopping, or whose 'property' they were liberating. Certainly this didn't count as high-handed respect for national sovereignty and freedom of the seas.
Secondly, I am not sure that the collapse of the Westphalian system, even if it did occur, would necessarily mean the decline of the west. Naturally, because the US and the other victors in 1945 did so much to set up the UN, and the current international finance system, it is advantageous to them, but I begin to wonder if it is necessarily as one-sided as you make out. What to make of the rise of China, to say nothing of the other 'Asian tiger' economies, and the almost total collapse of manufacturing in Europe and the US after 1945, with all of the industry going (primarily) to places like China.

I must also take exception with your characterisation of WWII. Only Germany was attempting to impose a system of racial purity, and even that ran parallel to their idea of the international system, rather than being a replacement. Japan and Italy were hardly likely to subscribe to such a doctrine, given that it classed both Italians and Japanese as 'lesser.' WWII can better be seen, I would argue, as a challenge to the old empires (British, Soviet, French and American) from aspiring empires, Germany and Japan (with Italy tagging along reluctantly in their wake). More simply, Germany and Japan were attempting, not to overthrow the world order, but merely to move themselves to the top of it. They were happy enough with the state system, except for the fact that other states like Britain and the US were in charge, and they weren't.

[Garnet]

I might reply in more detail later, maybe... my last post already resulted in me being late to an important meeting, I really should focus on real world arguments in *gasp* real life.

That said, I *never* suggested that states spare people from excessive violence. My points can be summed up as:

1. States, from 1648 - ~1900, provided more peace and security in Europe than the preceding feudal system based on the idea of a religious republic of Europe - the respublica Christiana.

2. The state system is *not* conducive to peace and security in the modern world - since the concept of sovereignty coupled with the post-WWII global economic system makes civil strife and autogenocide easy and frequent within the developing world (or, more precisely, in that part of the developing world which is failing to develop). *ON THIS POINT WE ALMOST AGREE* - only I lay most of the blame at the feet of the current global economic system making it extremely difficult for developing states to alleviate the suffering that spawns civil strife and insecurity (particular global currency exchange regulations - or the lack of them). The state itself (or something *like* a state) may make genocide possible, and be a pre-condition, but I reject your idea that there is a causal link: states do not automatically = genocide. The cause is something else, the state merely enables. That said, the legal idea of the state as sovereign makes it difficult for outside actors to take steps to prevent or end internal conflict and autogenocide - both in a legal and in a normative sense.

3. Collapses of international systems are bloody business. The end result may be a better system than what came before: the Westphalian State System has certainly been better for the mass of humanity than the old respublica Christiana, for example, but the population of Central Europe that died during the 30 Years' War isn't likely to agree. Likewise, I feel that we are living in a period of transition where the Westphalian system is slowly giving way to something that might look a lot like it at first, but instead of sovereignty bases itself on humanitarian principle. Any such change will be resisted, and will only succeed as a result of widespread violence and collapse in much of the developing world. I expect more Somalias and more DRCs and more Darfurs in the decades ahead. I hate to say it, but my future employment rather depends upon it, although I'd gladly look for other work if I'm wrong.

Appendix 1. It's also worth noting, that WWII was as nasty as it was because it was a *challenge* to the current system - an attempt to replace a system based on sovereignty with one based on racial purity, ie. a form of empire. As such, WWII did not occur 'within' the international state system, but was rather an unsuccessful assault upon it.

Appendix 2. The Westphalian system has served it's time. Insofar as I appreciate it, and do not share your dislike, it's because it did what it was meant to do and was undeniably better than what preceded it. Now it has outlived its usefulness and has transitioned into being part of the problem rather than the solution.

Appendix 3. Rome was never a state. It was a race-based empire which gradually transitioned into a universalist civilisation - but it never stopped being an empire. A look at its relations with sub-units both within and without its limes will make that clear: it was never a united single polity with one legal code throughout its territory (at least not until Justinian reformed the law code, but the Western Empire had fallen by then) but was rather a core polity relating to a wide variety of varying peripheral polities with a staggering array of statuses and agreements and levels of control.

The West is the only one doing humanitarian interventions. So are you saying it's going to be it's own downfall? There are many states where there could be humanitarian intervention and some which deserve it more than others, but the west isn't going to go in if it's not in its interest or at least not going to cause it problem. China is obviously the rising power and it's the one which promotes non intervention in domestic business the most. I'm just not seeing how the westphalian system is going to disappear anytime soon, since whose interest would it be in? Also what are you saying it's going to get replaced with?- "I feel that we are living in a period of transition where the Westphalian system is slowly giving way to something that might look a lot like it at first, but instead of sovereignty bases itself on humanitarian principle." - what does that mean in practical terms? It sounds like a utopia.



Sorry this has nothing to do with the original topic. I've not read Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations in a while but my understanding was that the biggest clash was going to be with the west and Islam - which seems slightly odd since Islam is a religion with lots of variations - they're not all fundamentalists. Also Islamic states vary, there's a big difference between Iran and the central asian republics, which are secular and have a separation of religion from the state in their constitution. Islam is not a united force. Also the permanent members of the security council are not Islamic and all are against Islamic extremism. I don't see how Islam will bring down the West.

Also on another note if the west does decline and another power rises e.g. China, it's still dependent on the west to trade with and so western influences in globalisation and the international system will still be relevant.

[LonelyPilgrim]

jollytiddlywink,

In response to:

I didn't say that states have a causal link, and certainly didn't say or imply that states automatically equal genocide. This is an argument I have already had with Empress, but to reiterate: genocide is something undertaken by states. Not all states undertake genocide. I earlier wrote: "genocide is inextricably linked with the modern state, but that doesn't imply that the reverse is also true." In other words, genocide cannot exist without the modern state, but the modern state can exist without genocide.

I will make a controversial and arguable counter-argument. I would contend that the Rwandan genocide contradicts your point. The government (which for our purposes just now I feel can be considered synonymous with 'the state') had been a tenuous power-sharing system between the Tutsi RPF and Hutu politicians and military leaders. The government collapsed and effectively stopped functioning in '93 when the civil war in Burundi spilled over into Rwanda. The Hutu 'government' was effectively decapitated with the assassination of the president and the death of prime minister in quick succession. The military and independent Hutu militia groups then killed between 500,000 and 800,000 Tutsi (and moderate Hutu) in the following three months - what has become known as the genocide. I contend that, with an ongoing civil war, and the government effectively decapitated and unable to exercise control over the militias, Rwanda was not a modern state at the time of the genocide. The government, as it existed, may have had a hand in creating the conditions for the genocide, but it did not prosecute it and it did not have the power to stop it (had it wanted to, whether it wanted to or not is another matter and irrelevant for this discussion).

I think this leaves us with two possible conclusions:

1) Either the Rwandan Genocide wasn't really a genocide

2) Or, genocide can and does occur outwith the state

The only alternative I can see is to try to argue that Rwanda was a modern Hutu-controlled state with a functioning government capable of orchestrating a purposeful extermination of the Tutsi population and that it did so - while maintaining control over events. I'll admit the argument can be made, but I personally think it fails on pretty much every point. In my opinion (and I'll admit I'm not an expert and haven't studied Rwanda in detail and am open to contrary evidence), the genocide in Rwanda was a social movement, effectively independent of the will of the 'government', and therefore not reliant upon a state to have occurred.

Next point:

I must also take exception with your characterisation of WWII. Only Germany was attempting to impose a system of racial purity, and even that ran parallel to their idea of the international system, rather than being a replacement. Japan and Italy were hardly likely to subscribe to such a doctrine, given that it classed both Italians and Japanese as 'lesser.' WWII can better be seen, I would argue, as a challenge to the old empires (British, Soviet, French and American) from aspiring empires, Germany and Japan (with Italy tagging along reluctantly in their wake). More simply, Germany and Japan were attempting, not to overthrow the world order, but merely to move themselves to the top of it. They were happy enough with the state system, except for the fact that other states like Britain and the US were in charge, and they weren't.

Absolutely not. Italy and Japan were both aspiring empires premised upon racial superiority - they adhered to the same form as Germany, they just didn't share the same conception of racial hierarchy. Most importantly all three were empires who premised themselves upon the idea of an international system that justified the right of conquest. That point alone means they were outside the existing system in which wars of territorial conquest had been outlawed by the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

They weren't trying to move to the top of the existing system, they were attempting to create a new system where only they had rights, and those rights were predicated upon racial superiority and the equating of morality and the use of power and force. Mussolini argued that Italy had an historical right to the re-creation of the Roman Empire. Hitler argued that Germans were a superior Aryan race whose needs (and rights to have those needs fulfilled) superseded all other claims by all other groups. Both claims were entirely irreconcilable with the proceeding 300 years of international law and hence with the existing system. It wasn't just that they broke the rules, the rules are broken frequently, it was that they wanted to replace the rules with rules and norms of their own - rules that were synonymous with their perceived national interest and which far exceeded the typical gaming of the system that powerful members (like the US) can and do engage in.

---------

I'll address my contention of humanitarianism and western decline in my next post and respond to you and Garnet together, since you sort of make the same points.

[LonelyPilgrim]

lol, it's complicated - 2 years Scottish & Modern History, 3 years Sustainable Development and currently finishing an MSc Environmental Resource Assessment. I suspect I'm unemployable . . . I have a passion for history though (I'd totally revamp the way history is taught in schools if I could), which is hard to work into a conversation! Hence I jump on these threads . . . . . Did you study philosphy or IR?

Ok, I lied, my massive response re: decline and humanitarianism will be the post after this... I just noticed I've been asked questions that don't require essay-length responses, so they win... :-P

Empress, my answer is yes. I studied both IR and philosophy and I've worked as a freelance ancient historian (although antiquarian would be more accurate, I suppose, since I worked with artefacts for collectors). Now I'm managing a small NGO that makes medical supply deliveries to war zones - currently Mogadishu.

You won't be unemployable: with that background, the international NGO community would be glad to have you. Breaking in can be tough though and involve starting out as a volunteer to get experience. Is that the sort of thing you are looking to do?

PS. I'd also revamp the way history is taught. But I'd also revamp almost everything else, too. :-P