Is the decline of the West inevitable?

[LonelyPilgrim]

Okay... here goes, with trepidation:

Garnet:

The West is the only one doing humanitarian interventions. So are you saying it's going to be it's own downfall? There are many states where there could be humanitarian intervention and some which deserve it more than others, but the west isn't going to go in if it's not in its interest or at least not going to cause it problem. China is obviously the rising power and it's the one which promotes non intervention in domestic business the most.

What you've said has been true for so long that it's taken as a given, but things have changed on the ground in a big way. To start with, most humanitarian intervention (peacekeeping and even peacemaking) being done in Africa for the last several years has been done by African forces as part of African regional institutions. In West Africa the principle actor is ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) and elsewhere it is the African Union. Both organisations have received significant Chinese support, in the form of equipment, training, and advisers and have seen rapid growth in their capabilities.

It is also worth noting that China seems to be abandoning its long policy of abstaining on all issues of intervention to come before the Security Council. In the case of Somalia, with which I am most familiar due to my work, China has been the most vociferous member on the Security Council in support of the proposed 23,000 man peacekeeping force. Coming from China, this is almost certainly due to considerations of national interest - such as future concessions in tapping Somalia's undeveloped and considerable offshore oil reserves. Regardless of the motive though, or the motives behind providing men and material to AU and ECOWAS deployments, China has abandoned their traditional absolute opposition to intervention. The significance of that shouldn't need explaining.

jollytiddlywink:

Secondly, I am not sure that the collapse of the Westphalian system, even if it did occur, would necessarily mean the decline of the west. Naturally, because the US and the other victors in 1945 did so much to set up the UN, and the current international finance system, it is advantageous to them, but I begin to wonder if it is necessarily as one-sided as you make out. What to make of the rise of China, to say nothing of the other 'Asian tiger' economies, and the almost total collapse of manufacturing in Europe and the US after 1945, with all of the industry going (primarily) to places like China.

The real imbalance isn't so much the way the system was set up in '45... that system was actually quite helpful for the developing world, since it guaranteed currency stability, provided negative interest loans to developing economies (yes, negative interest), and kept raw materials prices from plummeting. The 'Third' World saw rapid expansion of GDP, often in the double digits. The problem occurred when the Reagan administration coerced the US Federal Reserve to sharply raise the US reserve interest rate in the 70's. I'm not an economist, so I won't go into details. End result of the period, though, was crushing balance payments suddenly being due by most of the developing world and a floating international currency market (whereas before, exchange rates were tightly regulated, often fixed). This helps established economies because the current system promotes two behaviours among underdeveloped economies: 1) they have to hold massive currency reserves in order to prevent wild fluctuations of their currencies: this hampers domestic investment and 2) they have to dump massive quantities of raw materials onto the international market in order to raise the capital to make their debt payments: this drives raw material prices through the floor, greatly benefiting manufacturing economies. If that sounds like it ought to turn into a vicious and self-destructive cycle, it does.

So, who has escaped from the trap? Economies that invested in manufacturing when times were good: China and the like. Economies that invested in technology when times were good: Japan (it helped having reconstruction money). Economies that could attract lots of foreign direct investment due to developing strong state control and internal security and rule of law while times were good: most of the Asian Tigers. Economies which provide a raw material, the demand for which outstrips increases in production, driving prices up rather than down: oil producing nations.

China, due to its manufacturing base, benefits from the current system almost as much as the West. I say almost because it has currency issues. Its currency is not accepted on the international market, so for international purchases it has to use dollars (or euros) and it has trouble maintaining sufficient 'hard' currency reserves to make its international purchases. Still, it remains far better off, in this sense, than most non-Western economies and has effectively gained the economic momentum necessary to get the system working for it rather than against it.

Two other points:

1) The West, by and large, is still a manufacturing powerhouse - we just make different, more advanced (and hence fewer) things now. The idea of a total manufacturing collapse is hyperbole - look around, you'll still see plenty of factories and steel mills in operation - even shipyards, just not in Glasgow any more.

2) The Chinese government, either directly or through subsidiaries, owns majority interests in most of the South Asian economies and corporations, a condition they've carefully brought about over the last two decades. The Asian Tigers are, in a certain sense, actually Asian Puppets. South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines are the exceptions. Other than those, talk of the Asian economies is inseparable from Chinese economic and political interests. China's regional economic hegemony is very real and nearly absolute. US influence has eroded dramatically.

First, states (or empires) have been waging pre-emptive wars throughout the period (1648-2000) in question, and that doesn't seem to have toppled the system. The British assault on Copenhagen is but one example of a pre-emptive attack, an example which could be multiplied many hundreds of times, for the British Empire alone. To take a different case, the US sent troops to Haiti 16 times between 1900 and 1913, and did much the same in a dozen other countries in that part of the world, and continued to do so right through to the 1980s.

You are referring to the Battle of Copenhagen in 1801, right? Lord Nelson is one of my favourite historical characters, and that's one my favourite events in his life. But... I don't think it fits in here. The League of Armed Neutrality was questionably neutral at best. I'm sure we could argue that, but there isn't much point because...

It would have been more accurate of me to say that preventative war was the culprit rather than pre-emptive. Pre-emptive war, the use of military force to forestall or eliminate an obvious imminent threat, has always been quasi-acceptable under the Westphalian system.

Preventative War - defined as attacking a *potential* enemy to prevent them from gaining relative strength and becoming a greater threat, aka the Bush Doctrine (one of them anyway) - is what I should have said. The invasion of Iraq is the case in point. Hopefully the US will not be promulgating that doctrine any more now that we have a new president.

Also worth noting, the Westphalian system only applied among and between the Western powers until 1918/9 (one could argue until 1945). Other polities were considered to be outside the circle of 'civilised' states and not subject to 'civilised' codes of conduct. Colonial wars or US interventions in Latin America before that time don't count. US interventions after that point in time are violations, I'll agree, but we weren't trying to change the rules - we were just breaking them. The Bush Doctrine of Preventative War was an attempt to change the rules to allow for the aggressive use of force in response to potentially hostile nations building capacity without regard to their intentions (which is what separates it from the semi-acceptable pre-emptive war, which is based on perceptions of intention).

Secondly, I think that humanitarian intervention has some rather long, if tenuous roots. The British effort to impose an international moratorium on the slave-trade might qualify as an example, with British vessels not being too particular about whose ships they were stopping, or whose 'property' they were liberating. Certainly this didn't count as high-handed respect for national sovereignty and freedom of the seas.

I don't disagree. But I think we're seeing a change in nature and a change in scope today. Also, the Concert system made things wonky. It was a radical perversion of the Westphalian system, which was restored and strengthened post-WWI - at least on paper. A case could be made that the Westphalian system died a natural death in the Napoleonic Wars and was then resurrected at Versailles in 1918/9 after the Concert system clearly utterly failed. I actually think that if and when I go back to university, I might make that my dissertation topic... unless someone reads this and steals it or it's been done before and I just haven't seen it.

jollytiddlywink:

I must take issue with your idea that the Westphalian system is in collapse...

Garnet:

I'm just not seeing how the westphalian system is going to disappear anytime soon, since whose interest would it be in? Also what are you saying it's going to get replaced with?

I have a suspicion this is going to turn into my longest post ever... I apologise to one and all.

I assume we can agree that the Westphalian State System is based upon the norm of state sovereignty and that either a breakdown in sovereignty as a dominant norm or a wide scale collapse of the state as the primary organisational unit and primary actor in the system would equate to the collapse of that system.

I also assume that there is a distinction between reality and ideal and that to a certain extent reality can depart from the ideal and not signal a collapse, but a significant change in the ideal would indicate a collapse. In other words, violations of norms, up to a point, don't mean the system is collapsing, but major changes in the fundamental norms would mark the emergence of a different system.

I also assume that the Westphalian State System is an artefact of Western cultural supremacy, and a collapse in the system would be a de facto sign of Western cultural decline - unless the new system that emerges is Western in origin and benefits the West to an equal or greater degree.

I feel those are straightforward assumptions that we should be able to agree on (assuming no one here is a Marxist, Critical Theorist, or Post-Modernist IR scholar... and if anyone is, I haven't got the energy or the quantity of bourbon necessary to debate with you).

Right, given those, my contention:

I. The state is weakening in reality.

There are a lot of ways to make this point out there in the IR literature. They tend to divide between arguments for the convergence of the state into supra-national bodies like the EU or the collapse of the state into 'New Mediaevalism', like many post-Colonial states. These two observations are often put into contention as though only one trend can be true, but I don't buy that. Difference processes can work quite well in different places.

The surrender of significant sovereignty by European states to the various governing bodies of the EU and the adoption of a common currency for most of the continent makes it very difficult to talk about the average European state as ... well... a state (as traditionally defined). It'll be even harder if the EU ever adopts a constitution.

Meanwhile, in many, even most, states in the developing world, the government isn't able to exercise direct political control over its territory. A government in Africa is doing well if it's able to negotiate with warlords, tribal leaders, and regional strongmen inside its borders rather than be shot at by them. If the rule of law extends more than 50 miles outside the capital city, it's doing very well - definitely ahead of the curve. Basically, a state that chooses to allow sub-units to have political autonomy because it's convenient to do so can still be regarded as a state; a state in which sub-units have political autonomy because the state cannot hope to enforce any other arrangement isn't a state: it is much closer to the old European feudal system than the Westphalian state. And that's not evening considering places like the DRC or Somalia, which are little more than lines on a map - the Somali government doesn't even control the capital and relies on the 6300 AU troops in Mogadishu to hold what it does 'control' (and that's not counting the de facto independence of Somaliland - another challenge to its territorial integrity/sovereignty) and the DRC has more or less abandoned the eastern part of the country to complete and utter anarchy.

My examples are African because the case is most stark there and because I work with Africa, so it's what I know best. More generally, though, even 'stable' states are thoroughly compromised by multi-national corporations which often have more annual revenue than the state itself, massive foreign investment, and dependence on development aid. That reality knows no continental boundaries.

I think that those of us who live in the West have a tendency to look around ourselves at our own countries and assume that they represent 'normal'. They do not. Western states are exceptionally well-established, stable, and robust - and in a minority. The reality for the vast majority of states is a state of dependence on outside actors for continued growth, prosperity, and stability and a strong sense of virtual powerlessness in the face of a hostile international economic climate and one that is currently decimating the modest gains of the last decade - in a global recession the developing world suffers like we can't imagine. Commodity prices and orders fall, aid budgets shrink, and remittances sharply decline - a triple blow that results in high unemployment and major deprivation among populations living in countries that, as a rule, have no social support systems. And they're the lucky ones who aren't embroiled in civil conflict - yet.

II. The real weakening of the state weakens the norm of sovereignty

As states weaken, particularly in the developing world, they become increasingly vulnerable to internal collapse and intrastate conflict (including auto-genocide). Generally, here and there, it's not a problem, systemically. But... if it seems like the prevalence of instability and conflict is rising, it's not a result of media manipulation... it really is rising. And it's going to rise even more. Development professors I've been working closely with lately are pretty bleak about the political and social effects this current recession is going to have in the developing world. "More Somalias" is a term I've been hearing a lot.

Too much instability in too many places threatens national interests in the developed world. And when national interests get threatened, the argument for intervention gets louder. I've already mentioned that China has abandoned its non-interventionist dogma. Sovereignty will be weakened because a certain level of peace and stability is necessary for the functioning of the world economy and the developed nations are beginning to worry that we're passing the safety point. There's also growing awareness that the only way to ensure peace and stability is by ensuring a certain level of prosperity and development. Hence the UN's Millenium Development Goals (which are, in my opinion, rubbish, but that's beside the point). Hence the US Navy's (and some European countries) new policy of cruising up and down the West African coast providing training and capacity building support to the fledgling navies there as a form of conflict prevention. Hence the rising interest in doing something about Somalia and about Darfur.

III. The confluence of state weakness, weakening of sovereignty, and the need to 'do something' leads to a rise of humanitarianism - further weakening the state

Any introductory IR textbook will have a section about the rise of humanitarianism (which encompasses more than just armed intervention). The subject isn't new, it's been an identified and growing trend since the early 70s that really seems to be picking up speed now.

Fundamentally, the arguments for intervention on the part of the major powers arise out of self-interest, but that conception of what that interest is has been changing. It is increasingly becoming the case that state collapse and civil conflict represent regional threats, which in turn represent threats to the global economy. In order to contain conflicts, prompt recovery from conflicts, and prevent conflicts the awareness is spreading that a minimum standard of human rights will have to be enforced and a minimum level of development achieved in order to minimize the risk of intrastate conflict. In other words, humanitarianism is becoming a security issue. The track record on acting on this issue so far has been abysmal, but that might be changing.

There is a lot of talk out there about the "New Humanitarianism" - the label denotes a conceptual shift away from traditional models of aid (giving money to governments) to newer models meant to be less corrupt and more efficient (giving aid directly to those in need, local projects, training programs, etc.) - which bypasses the state and has the NGO or IGO interfacing directly with community leaders and individuals. There is a growing belief that the state gets in the way of effective aid programs - I happen to agree with that position, but that's not relevant, what is relevant is that the provision of aid is rapidly changing to a way that - by design - weakens the state at the same time as the weakness of many states is prompting increases in the provision of aid!

"New Humanitarianism" also argues that human rights are tied to economic security are tied to traditional security and the use of military force in conflict prevention is justified. A key document in the movement is the Carnegie Final Report on Preventing Deadly Conflict from 1997 which was adopted and endorsed by the UN. A lot of current American scholarship, especially out of the Kennedy School at Harvard, is advocating for more forceful humanitarianism and the abandonment of pacifism as a hallmark of the field.

Conclusions

The overall effect seems to be a slow but quickening shift in the conception of international security away from sovereignty - which is state security - to a more expansive idea of human security - as support to the state security of the major powers, of course. I don't believe we will ever have a system that gets entirely away from Thucydides' observation that "the strong do as they will..." - the question only becomes what is the standard by which countries are judged and deviations are measured. I believe that standard already takes human rights into account, but I think the importance of human rights is going to increase and the way that we conceive of human rights is going to change them from a negative duty (don't violate human rights) to a positive duty (support human rights and human security and human development) and the options for enforcement will become more prevalent - subject to (a reconceived) national interest as always.

Garnet:

Also what are you saying it's going to get replaced with?- "I feel that we are living in a period of transition where the Westphalian system is slowly giving way to something that might look a lot like it at first, but instead of sovereignty bases itself on humanitarian principle." - what does that mean in practical terms? It sounds like a utopia.

I think it's just as likely to be dystopia. After all, if the system changes to one that promises humanitarian outcomes, but can't deliver on those outcomes (and the track records for development aid, humanitarian interventions, and conflict prevention so far are very very grim) it isn't going to be stable or enduring. I see two possible outcomes:

I. Humanitarianism finds a way to work

In this case, the developed states remain a lot like they are now, which is good for us... except, a precondition for humanitarian success is going to be a fairer international economic and financial system and, as a result, while the West will remain relatively affluent, I think standard of livings are still likely to drop (as they probably need to).

Developing states stop being states in all but name and become much more focused on communities - this leaves them wide open for corporate influence from MNCs, but the worst excesses that exist now (sponsored coups, private armies, horrible safety standards) are internationally controlled - to an extent. Standards of living improve, but not by leaps and bounds - best to hope for is probably an end to (or more realistically, a sharp reduction in) world hunger, a minimum of standard medical care, universal primary and widespread secondary education, clean water almost everywhere, and modest economic opportunity. Improvement, yes; utopia, no.

And getting to that point will be a bloody process: a failed state is still a failed state and it would take time for a new system to organise itself. Quite aside from that, it'll take a few more Somalias and a few more Darfurs before governments stop paying rhetorical lip service to humanitarianism and start backing up their words with serious action.

II. Humanitarianism can't find a model that works

I think you get an even bloodier process here, since failed interventions give you more Somalias that are even more like Somalia. Continued lack of success causes massive donor fatigue among the developed nations and you see the world default to a traditional balance of power system. Global economic instability due to rising endemic conflict in the formerly developing world causes major problems in the developed world, standards of living drop dramatically. Interventions in the form of resource pillage and neo-colonialism become the norm and there is a return to Spheres of Influence as an organising principle.

Either way, the West sees a decline in living standards and a corresponding decline in military power. It's inherent in either outcome, both in absolute and in relative terms, I think. The only question is one of degree, and I don't care to predict.

Of course, humanitarianism could lose its bid to replace sovereignty as the foundational norm... but I think if that happens the world just skips to outcome II and gets there twenty years faster. The other forces weakening most states will undermine sovereignty through one process or another and we'll see a different system with norms that differ to greater or lesser extents.

I've been up now for almost three days, I can feel my brain stopping working. There are, of course, other ways things could go... many many different ways, I just happen to feel that the options I've outlined here are the most likely. Of course, I'm biased - I work as a humanitarian and in order to placate my ego I probably subconsciously project too much importance onto the subject and read a disproportionate amount of material that supports that view. And seeing as I'm in NGO marketing, it behooves me to be passionate and unreasonable about these sorts of things. :-P

[Humphrey]

Holy shit ^^^^^ That's almost a dissertation.

I'm never going to read that in one sitting.

[LonelyPilgrim]

:o Holy shit ^^^^^ That's almost a dissertation.

I'm never going to read that in one sitting.

I don't blame you. I didn't write it in one sitting. First time I've used the 'save' feature on here...

[Hennessy]

:o Holy shit ^^^^^ That's almost a dissertation.

I'm never going to read that in one sitting.

I don't blame you. I didn't write it in one sitting. First time I've used the 'save' feature on here...

Well I do believe the 'pedant of the year' award is firmly within your grasp now Pilgrim

[LonelyPilgrim]

:o Holy shit ^^^^^ That's almost a dissertation.

I'm never going to read that in one sitting.

I don't blame you. I didn't write it in one sitting. First time I've used the 'save' feature on here...

Well I do believe the 'pedant of the year' award is firmly within your grasp now Pilgrim

Because I wrote a long post? It's funny, but I figured this was a forum for university students (and alumni). If all I wanted to do was be angry at the world and post links to disgusting pictures, any old forum would do.

But that's ok, I know it's easier to dismiss someone with an ad hominem instead of engaging with their ideas, and university is hard enough as it is, so belittle away...

[jollytiddlywink]

:o Holy shit ^^^^^ That's almost a dissertation.

I'm never going to read that in one sitting.

I don't blame you. I didn't write it in one sitting. First time I've used the 'save' feature on here...

Well I do believe the 'pedant of the year' award is firmly within your grasp now Pilgrim

Because I wrote a long post? It's funny, but I figured this was a forum for university students (and alumni). If all I wanted to do was be angry at the world and post links to disgusting pictures, any old forum would do.

But that's ok, I know it's easier to dismiss someone with an ad hominem instead of engaging with their ideas, and university is hard enough as it is, so belittle away...
*************************************************************************************
It is indeed a forum for students and alumni, and I'm quite pleased to have a serious debate (although I must confess at having been slightly awestruck when I realised the sheer size of your reply. While uni may be hard enough as it is, there's no reason not to sharpen one's skills by every means available, and clearly this forum has got some heavy-weight intellectual sparring going on.
I'm going to do my best to engage with your answer shortly... once I have gone and got some chocolate to keep me fuelled!

[the Empress]

[quote="LonelyPilgrim
worked as a freelance ancient historian (although antiquarian would be more accurate, I suppose, since I worked with artefacts for collectors). Now I'm managing a small NGO that makes medical supply deliveries to war zones - currently Mogadishu. . . . Breaking in can be tough though and involve starting out as a volunteer to get experience. Is that the sort of thing you are looking to do?[/quote]

That's an interesting background - my historian graduate friend was just talking tonight about finding it hard to break into careers related to history . . . . Volunteering is a huge problem for NGO and environmental work. I know I'm going to struggle getting a job in these sectors for a while because I simply haven't had the time, and more importantly, the money, to devote to volunteering. But I'm desperate for some kind of adventure at this point, so give it 6-12 months and I'm determing to run off abroad . . .

Since I've been out bird surveying, the RSPB Red List is on my brain, and hence, agriculture. Food production will propbably be heavily implicated in any decline. Here, humanitarian aid can reduce starvation but probably not the causation of famine. There have been famines where food has continued being exported from the area - so, in terms of globalisation-alleviated food problems, I'm not convinced. Britain hasn't been self-sufficient in food for a few decades - the west is very vulnerable in this respect, I think. I would agree however that western standard of living has to drop - or at least, I wish development rhetoric would admit that everyone *cannot* enjoy the current western standard/mode of living, there simply isn't the resources. You'd need to either reduce western living standard to achieve some kind of middle-ground equity, or radically alter the system, so that the production (processes behind) of living standards is different.

I've been in classes recently where this issue came up, and people have stated that as we reached this standard of living first we should be allowed to maintain it, and developing countries not allowed to attain it (the theory being, theirs would still rise a bit, and ours wouldn't drop, so that'd be fine). The guy from Gambia in the back was like WTF?!

[LonelyPilgrim]

Empress,

I broke into NGO management by accident. An old classmate (we weren't really friends) from high school ran into me, and knowing that I had studied IR at St Andrews started talking to me about the NGO he'd founded. By the end of that conversation I was a consultant and by the end of that contract the board had decided to hire me.

Before that point, I'd have had no idea how to break into the field, even though I wanted to. I've since realised that just being around - demonstrating a willingness to work and showing that you really care about whatever issue it is you care about will get you noticed and eventually opportunities will present themselves.

As for food and development... I could type pages. But I won't. That might be pedantic. :-P Suffice to say that there is a lot wrong with the ... ideology... of development, but with the work of men like William Easterly, that might be changing. I hope so anyway. And I agree that our standard of living has to drop, at least somewhat. It's not a moral argument for me, simply a pragmatic one. The current inequality breeds resentment and hate - which in turn leads to conflict that threatens everyone.

[jollytiddlywink]

I have cut out large swathes of the quotation, i.e. everything I don't address directly. It seems worth it to shorten the post.

Okay... here goes, with trepidation:

To start with, most humanitarian intervention (peacekeeping and even peacemaking) being done in Africa for the last several years has been done by African forces as part of African regional institutions.

It is also worth noting that China seems to be abandoning its long policy of abstaining on all issues of intervention to come before the Security Council. In the case of Somalia, with which I am most familiar due to my work, China has been the most vociferous member on the Security Council in support of the proposed 23,000 man peacekeeping force. Coming from China, this is almost certainly due to considerations of national interest - such as future concessions in tapping Somalia's undeveloped and considerable offshore oil reserves. Regardless of the motive though, or the motives behind providing men and material to AU and ECOWAS deployments, China has abandoned their traditional absolute opposition to intervention. The significance of that shouldn't need explaining.

So, China is imitating a western idea of intervention, having previously rejected it on the basis that it was a potential threat to China. This seems to me like China is adopting a successful/useful western policy. I don't see how the continuing spread and adoption of western practices is meant to undermine the west. I understand that you are arguing that the idea of humanitarian intervention undermines the Westphalian system, but your argument is weak in two places: one, you suggest that it was dead after 1815 and was resurrected in 1919 (hardly a period of western decline), and two, it only undermines the system in places where the system is already weak, like Africa and other parts of the developing world where there are quite a few failing, failed or weak states. It's only a humanitarian intervention if the territory subject to intervention doesn't have a government and military able to resist... de facto, otherwise it would be a straight invasion/occupation, albeit one conducted for lofty ideals.


Regarding the economics of the Asian tigers, etc, I'm not an economist, either, so I think I'd best leave the dismal science well enough alone.

First, states (or empires) have been waging pre-emptive wars throughout the period (1648-2000) in question, and that doesn't seem to have toppled the system. The British assault on Copenhagen is but one example of a pre-emptive attack, an example which could be multiplied many hundreds of times, for the British Empire alone. To take a different case, the US sent troops to Haiti 16 times between 1900 and 1913, and did much the same in a dozen other countries in that part of the world, and continued to do so right through to the 1980s.

You are referring to the Battle of Copenhagen in 1801, right? Lord Nelson is one of my favourite historical characters, and that's one my favourite events in his life. But... I don't think it fits in here. The League of Armed Neutrality was questionably neutral at best. I'm sure we could argue that, but there isn't much point because...

It would have been more accurate of me to say that preventative war was the culprit rather than pre-emptive. Pre-emptive war, the use of military force to forestall or eliminate an obvious imminent threat, has always been quasi-acceptable under the Westphalian system.

Preventative War - defined as attacking a *potential* enemy to prevent them from gaining relative strength and becoming a greater threat, aka the Bush Doctrine (one of them anyway) - is what I should have said. The invasion of Iraq is the case in point. Hopefully the US will not be promulgating that doctrine any more now that we have a new president.

Also worth noting, the Westphalian system only applied among and between the Western powers until 1918/9 (one could argue until 1945). Other polities were considered to be outside the circle of 'civilised' states and not subject to 'civilised' codes of conduct. Colonial wars or US interventions in Latin America before that time don't count. US interventions after that point in time are violations, I'll agree, but we weren't trying to change the rules - we were just breaking them. The Bush Doctrine of Preventative War was an attempt to change the rules to allow for the aggressive use of force in response to potentially hostile nations building capacity without regard to their intentions (which is what separates it from the semi-acceptable pre-emptive war, which is based on perceptions of intention).

Well, how many other states were there in the rest of the world before 1900? There were lots of tribes, and some kingdoms, but places like China and Japan were, if sophisticated political structures, not states by any real measure, any more than European kingdoms were states in the 1300s. If the Westphalian system is between states, the non-states of the rest of the world (before the rest of the world got colonised) were hardly likely to be included, even before we factor in ideas of European cultural superiority, civilising mission, etc.
I would argue that umpteen US interventions in numerous different countries do count, in a way that colonial wars don't. The US was intervening in a recognised state, for neither pre-emptive or preventative reasons. It was either taking steps to protect US corporate interests, or to install a government it preferred to the current one, and often both at once. It seems a little convenient to just write this off as something that 'doesn't count.' Besides, even if we accept that post-1945 is the beginning of Westphalia applying to non-western-power states, then how do you explain Grenada in the 1980s, as just one of the dozens of times the US took action, overtly or covertly, to interfere in the internal workings of other states? The Bay of Pigs in Cuba? British, French, US, Japanese interventions in Russia/USSR during the Civil War there (if we're going to be slightly generous and count Russia as a 'western power')?

Secondly, I think that humanitarian intervention has some rather long, if tenuous roots. The British effort to impose an international moratorium on the slave-trade might qualify as an example, with British vessels not being too particular about whose ships they were stopping, or whose 'property' they were liberating. Certainly this didn't count as high-handed respect for national sovereignty and freedom of the seas.

I don't disagree. But I think we're seeing a change in nature and a change in scope today. Also, the Concert system made things wonky. It was a radical perversion of the Westphalian system, which was restored and strengthened post-WWI - at least on paper. A case could be made that the Westphalian system died a natural death in the Napoleonic Wars and was then resurrected at Versailles in 1918/9 after the Concert system clearly utterly failed. I actually think that if and when I go back to university, I might make that my dissertation topic... unless someone reads this and steals it or it's been done before and I just haven't seen it.[/quote]

If the Westphalian system did die in 1815, it wasn't resurrected in 1919 so much as reconstructed Frankenstein-style. The breakup of imperial states, replaced either by events or by Wilsonian self-determination with new nation-states, was a real departure. Only a few states prior to that point (Italy and Germany) had come into being around nationalities... most other states, like the UK, France and Spain, built their states and more or less constructed the inhabitants into a nation later. 1919 marks the watershed between states being the organising force behind the international system, and nations being the basic organisational force. Since then, things have swung back towards states, I would argue, because many commentators seem to feel that there are already two many states in the world, and too many of them are either very small or absolutely tiny. One need look no further than 1930s C/E Europe to see the problems for small states. From 1919 to 1989, it is possible to argue that the power of states, in their newer incarnation of nation-states, actually increased, as the legitimacy of large imperial powers, not based around nations, declined. A change to Westphalian, but not a decline.

I assume we can agree that the Westphalian State System is based upon the norm of state sovereignty and that either a breakdown in sovereignty as a dominant norm or a wide scale collapse of the state as the primary organisational unit and primary actor in the system would equate to the collapse of that system.

I also assume that there is a distinction between reality and ideal and that to a certain extent reality can depart from the ideal and not signal a collapse, but a significant change in the ideal would indicate a collapse. In other words, violations of norms, up to a point, don't mean the system is collapsing, but major changes in the fundamental norms would mark the emergence of a different system.

I also assume that the Westphalian State System is an artefact of Western cultural supremacy, and a collapse in the system would be a de facto sign of Western cultural decline - unless the new system that emerges is Western in origin and benefits the West to an equal or greater degree.

I feel those are straightforward assumptions that we should be able to agree on (assuming no one here is a Marxist, Critical Theorist, or Post-Modernist IR scholar... and if anyone is, I haven't got the energy or the quantity of bourbon necessary to debate with you).

I agree with the basis of your argument, except the idea that it is a relic of Western cultural supremacy. I think it's much better to see it as a result of political and military supremacy. The west created political and military institutions which the rest of the world simply could not resist, unless they copied them: witness Japan between 1870 and 1905: it adopted western political forms, and copied an army from Germany and a Navy from Britain, and then thrashed Russia in a war. In the 1850s, Japan was utterly incapable of resisting any western power who wished to sign a one-sided treaty. Peter the Great in Russia did much the same to Russia, except a lot earlier.

The state still is the main organisational factor, and the main in the system: the EU might be weakening state sovereignty, but only to the extend that it is creating a larger political power-structure, in a similar fashion to the US: Virginia has little sovereignty, but the Federal government has a lot. I doubt anyone would seriously argue that the US is an example of a decline of state sovereignty. So, while this analogy does not extend perfectly to Europe, I think it is worth recognising that such sovereignty as individual European states do give up is not lost, but is collected by a higher political power, which *might* in time become a large and powerful state in its own right.

I. The state is weakening in reality.

Having tackled the supra-national state (EU), I'll address the feudalised states of Africa. If they can't control their own territory, enforce such laws as they pass, or maintain a monopoly on the use of force, then they aren't states. The fact that they are trying to be states suggests to me the continuing strength of the Westphalian idea, rather than its collapse. Your points about the reliance on international corporations and international markets weakening sovereignty are perfectly valid, but this is something which has been going on for the last century at least, if not a bit longer. Yes, today the pressures are stronger, but it strikes me as a difference in degree rather than in kind. But even if I concede the point and say that state sovereignty is weaker, that doesn't mean it is gone, or that it is in abeyance as an organising principle.

II. The real weakening of the state weakens the norm of sovereignty

As states weaken, particularly in the developing world, they become increasingly vulnerable to internal collapse and intrastate conflict (including auto-genocide)....

Too much instability in too many places threatens national interests in the developed world. And when national interests get threatened, the argument for intervention gets louder. I've already mentioned that China has abandoned its non-interventionist dogma. Sovereignty will be weakened because a certain level of peace and stability is necessary for the functioning of the world economy and the developed nations are beginning to worry that we're passing the safety point. There's also growing awareness that the only way to ensure peace and stability is by ensuring a certain level of prosperity and development. Hence the UN's Millenium Development Goals (which are, in my opinion, rubbish, but that's beside the point). Hence the US Navy's (and some European countries) new policy of cruising up and down the West African coast providing training and capacity building support to the fledgling navies there as a form of conflict prevention. Hence the rising interest in doing something about Somalia and about Darfur.

Fair points. I would suggest that intervention might be a result of weak sovereignty and weak or failed states, but the ultimate objective of intervention is still to create viable and stable states: that is what the US is trying to do in Iraq, and what NATO is trying to do in Afghanistan. US and NATO naval training of African navies is surely part and parcel of state-building, strengthening the military resources of states? Fair enough, maybe the need for this to occur is a symptom of decline rather than an indication of the continuing validity of states as the organisational norm in the international system, but certainly it makes the idea of decline much less clear-cut and self-evident.

III. The confluence of state weakness, weakening of sovereignty, and the need to 'do something' leads to a rise of humanitarianism - further weakening the state

Any introductory IR textbook will have a section about the rise of humanitarianism (which encompasses more than just armed intervention). The subject isn't new, it's been an identified and growing trend since the early 70s that really seems to be picking up speed now.

Fundamentally, the arguments for intervention on the part of the major powers arise out of self-interest, but that conception of what that interest is has been changing. It is increasingly becoming the case that state collapse and civil conflict represent regional threats, which in turn represent threats to the global economy. In order to contain conflicts, prompt recovery from conflicts, and prevent conflicts the awareness is spreading that a minimum standard of human rights will have to be enforced and a minimum level of development achieved in order to minimize the risk of intrastate conflict. In other words, humanitarianism is becoming a security issue. The track record on acting on this issue so far has been abysmal, but that might be changing.

There is a lot of talk out there about the "New Humanitarianism" - the label denotes a conceptual shift away from traditional models of aid (giving money to governments) to newer models meant to be less corrupt and more efficient (giving aid directly to those in need, local projects, training programs, etc.) - which bypasses the state and has the NGO or IGO interfacing directly with community leaders and individuals. There is a growing belief that the state gets in the way of effective aid programs - I happen to agree with that position, but that's not relevant, what is relevant is that the provision of aid is rapidly changing to a way that - by design - weakens the state at the same time as the weakness of many states is prompting increases in the provision of aid!

"New Humanitarianism" also argues that human rights are tied to economic security are tied to traditional security and the use of military force in conflict prevention is justified. A key document in the movement is the Carnegie Final Report on Preventing Deadly Conflict from 1997 which was adopted and endorsed by the UN. A lot of current American scholarship, especially out of the Kennedy School at Harvard, is advocating for more forceful humanitarianism and the abandonment of pacifism as a hallmark of the field.

Again, fair points. You are doubtless on much firmer ground than I am when arguing about the situation in Africa regarding humanitarianism, aid, etc. I will confine myself to observing that this set of stability/aid/economic/human rights interdependence, all of which serve to undermine the state, seem to apply only to the under-developed world, largely in Africa. This might undermine the state where it is already weak, but I don't see how, by extension, this is meant to undermine powerful and cohesive states in the developed world, or even those states in the developing world which are facing difficulties but are still making headway... i.e. not becoming basket cases. Simply put, I am not convinced by your inference that further erosion of state sovereignty in areas where it and or states are already weak (which I don't deny seems to be occurring) will thus proceed to undermine all states and all sovereignty.

Either way, the West sees a decline in living standards and a corresponding decline in military power. It's inherent in either outcome, both in absolute and in relative terms, I think. The only question is one of degree, and I don't care to predict.

I feel I must say that living standards and military power are so loosely correlated as to be entirely independent of each other. Living standards in Germany were far higher than in the USSR 1941-45, but the USSR was strong enough to take on the majority of the German military through the entire war and crush it. Military power does rest heavily on economic might, population and technological development, which have a bearing on living standards, too. But military power depends on the years and decades prior to any given point in time, for the build-up of the equipment, barracks, airfields, ports, and most importantly, the training of highly specialised and professional men and women to use the equipment, and the training of equally specialised and professional officers to lead them properly. Living standards tend to increase more or less on a par with economic growth, but military power can be, to a surprisingly large extent, independent of economic growth, certainly in the short-to-medium term. Forgive me for being pedantic about military matters... I feel the need to inject such expertise as I have into the conversation from time to time!

[the Empress]

Well, how many other states were there in the rest of the world before 1900? There were lots of tribes, and some kingdoms, but places like China and Japan were, if sophisticated political structures, not states by any real measure, any more than European kingdoms were states in the 1300s. If the Westphalian system is between states, the non-states of the rest of the world (before the rest of the world got colonised) were hardly likely to be included, even before we factor in ideas of European cultural superiority, civilising mission, etc.

Um, have you read anything pre-20C? Or non-western history? Or even colonial history? I'm getting a bit concerned.

[jollytiddlywink]

Well, how many other states were there in the rest of the world before 1900? There were lots of tribes, and some kingdoms, but places like China and Japan were, if sophisticated political structures, not states by any real measure, any more than European kingdoms were states in the 1300s. If the Westphalian system is between states, the non-states of the rest of the world (before the rest of the world got colonised) were hardly likely to be included, even before we factor in ideas of European cultural superiority, civilising mission, etc.

Um, have you read anything pre-20C? Or non-western history? Or even colonial history? I'm getting a bit concerned.

I've read a fair bit of each. Rather difficult to avoid, really, having done the modern history and Scottish history survey courses in first and second year, and doing some colonial history in honours. I think you misunderstand my point: there were plenty of non-western political entities out there, and a good number of them, like Japan and China, were very advanced (China having done impressive things while Europeans were still painting themselves blue, living in huts, and generally being barbarians). But their political development did not continue apace with what Europe later achieved post-1650s, and by the height of the colonial period, Europe had more sophisticated political structures, and a lot of the rest of the world looked to Europe to be 'less developed', and less state-like. Certainly I think it is generally safe to say that wide swathes of the non-west were not under the control of what we would now recognise as 'states', any more than we would recognise the dynastically-held and feudally complex kingdoms of early modern Europe to be modern states. Perhaps I ought to have said "not modern states by any real measure..." which would, given the outlook of the times, have allowed the Europeans of the time to place them outside the bounds of the Westphalian system... which is the point I was making to LP.

[the Empress]

I think you an incredibly Eurocentric viewpoint.

[jollytiddlywink]

jollytiddlywink,

In response to:

I didn't say that states have a causal link, and certainly didn't say or imply that states automatically equal genocide. This is an argument I have already had with Empress, but to reiterate: genocide is something undertaken by states. Not all states undertake genocide. I earlier wrote: "genocide is inextricably linked with the modern state, but that doesn't imply that the reverse is also true." In other words, genocide cannot exist without the modern state, but the modern state can exist without genocide.

I will make a controversial and arguable counter-argument. I would contend that the Rwandan genocide contradicts your point. (...)

I think this leaves us with two possible conclusions:

1) Either the Rwandan Genocide wasn't really a genocide

2) Or, genocide can and does occur outwith the state

The only alternative I can see is to try to argue that Rwanda was a modern Hutu-controlled state with a functioning government capable of orchestrating a purposeful extermination of the Tutsi population and that it did so - while maintaining control over events. I'll admit the argument can be made, but I personally think it fails on pretty much every point. In my opinion (and I'll admit I'm not an expert and haven't studied Rwanda in detail and am open to contrary evidence), the genocide in Rwanda was a social movement, effectively independent of the will of the 'government', and therefore not reliant upon a state to have occurred.

A good counter-point, but one that I can't help but feel is the exception which proves the rule. All the other genocides in the 20th century that I can bring to mind (alas, quite a few), from the Armenians in Turkey, the Ukranians during collectivisation in the 1930s, the Jews, Gypsies, Slavs, and many others, in Nazi Germany, the victims of Khmer Rouge, all died under states which took purposeful efforts to administer mass killings of specific groups, however defined. I suspect that Baumann would suggest that because modernity is now over, his contention that only states committed genocide in the modern era stands unchallenged, but (as well as that being needlessly cheeky and underhanded) I don't buy everything about his argument, so I'll leave that aside.

Absolutely not. Italy and Japan were both aspiring empires premised upon racial superiority - they adhered to the same form as Germany, they just didn't share the same conception of racial hierarchy. Most importantly all three were empires who premised themselves upon the idea of an international system that justified the right of conquest. That point alone means they were outside the existing system in which wars of territorial conquest had been outlawed by the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

They weren't trying to move to the top of the existing system, they were attempting to create a new system where only they had rights, and those rights were predicated upon racial superiority and the equating of morality and the use of power and force. Mussolini argued that Italy had an historical right to the re-creation of the Roman Empire. Hitler argued that Germans were a superior Aryan race whose needs (and rights to have those needs fulfilled) superseded all other claims by all other groups. Both claims were entirely irreconcilable with the proceeding 300 years of international law and hence with the existing system. It wasn't just that they broke the rules, the rules are broken frequently, it was that they wanted to replace the rules with rules and norms of their own - rules that were synonymous with their perceived national interest and which far exceeded the typical gaming of the system that powerful members (like the US) can and do engage in.

i must insist that neither Japan nor Italy was attempting expansion under the auspices of supposed racial superiority. Mussolini did hanker after reviving the glories of the Roman Empire, but there was no racial basis for this: in fact, quite the reverse. He is on record as bemoaning the lackadaisical and un-warlike quality of the Italian race. He planned to plant forests over much of Italy, in hopes of cooling the climate and thus making Italians more warlike.
Japan did not have any feeling of racial superiority, or at least none which informed their policy: if anything, the national humiliations the Japanese felt at the unequal treaties of the 1860s and 70s, and the embarrassing concessions which were forced on them after the First Sino-Japanese War, created an inferiority complex and a wish to ensure such things could never happen again. An immensely strong sense of national pride, and a feeling of being a historically favoured nation, drove them forwards.
Even Germany based their expansion on racial superiority only in the East, over the 'untermenschen' Slavs. The German racial theory deemed the Scandinavians, the Dutch and Belgians, and the French and British to be either Aryan or as close to parity with Aryans that it didn't matter. Hitler had great respect for Britain in particular, and only grudgingly undertook further action against the UK after the fall of France. He said, "We have committed a world-historical error. We should have the Anglo-Saxon powers on our side," after he declared war on the US. He would gladly have split the world up with the British--Germany controlling the continent, and Britain her empire, if only anyone in Britain was willing to negotiate on that basis. The forms of German occupation confirm this. Denmark was scarcely occupied at all, and even France was administered by a handful of Wehrmacht officers, who kept an eye of the civilian Vichy administration but otherwise did not interfere, at least until the resistance took off in 1943. France kept her colonies, her navy and her own government. From 1940 to roughly 1943, Germany aimed to build a Volkergemeinschaft (community of Peoples) across Europe. 'Inferior peoples' were excluded from this, but these peoples all inhabited Eastern Europe: Poland was made to disappear from the maps, as was Czechoslovakia, and it was only the insurmountable logistics involved, and the economic dislocation it would entail, which prevented the Germans from undertaking a wholesale eradication of the Polish population. As it was, steps were taken to turn the Polish population into a leaderless labour force to serve German ends.

Italy and Japan were perfectly happy with the prevailing state system, and were seeking to expand within it, not to overturn it. Japan aimed to create a large Pacific Empire for itself, to make itself more or less self-sufficient in oil and various metals, which the Home Islands were conspicuously lacking. Japan was an old-fashioned authoritarian regime, with militaristic, nationalistic and imperial motivations. It wanted an empire, and to become a Power of the first rank. Italy under Mussolini is more difficult to read, because Mussolini, unlike Hitler, was a complex character. But Italy was not seeking to make itself an international hegemon. Mussolini wanted a glorious empire: the only reason he would have bothered to invade either Ethiopia, or Albania, the latter of which was already an Italian protectorate with Italian troops occupying it!

It is difficult to see why the waging of aggressive war in 1939 was any different from the waging of it in 1914, or in 1870, or in... If you are going to suggest that suddenly Germany was seeking to overturn the entire international order, rather than simply alter it to her benefit, I suggest that you will need better evidence than the Kellogg-Briand treaty which supposedly outlawed war. Unless you can provide any evidence that Germany, Italy or Japan was seeking to replace the international system with rules of their own, you're on shaky ground. Yes, they were aggressive, and waged aggressive war. But so did the USSR: the Winter War against Finland, for example, in 1939-40. Britain occupied Iceland, violated (neutral) Norwegian waters to take British prisoners off the Altmark, and later violated Norwegian neutrality again to being mine-laying in Norwegian territorial waters (Britain thus narrowly beat the Germans in being the first power to undertake aggression against Norway). Churchill himself remarked that Britain must not allow "the rights of small nations" to tie her hands. France had plans to bomb the (neutral) Soviet oil-wells in Baku to try to cut off German oil supplies. Britain and France had plans, never realised, to seize large areas of (neutral) Sweden and Norway to deliver supplies to the Finns, and to cut off imports of Swedish iron ore to Germany. Britain fired on and sank large portions of the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir in 1940, killing roughly 1400 French sailors. France was neutral at that time, and had been a close ally mere weeks before. All of these are aggressive attacks, in violation of international law. If you make aggression the litmus test for the desire to completely overthrow the international system, you implicate virtually everyone. If you apply your suggestion that "empires which are predicated on the right of conquest" are explicitly aiming to overturn the world order (I paraphrase) to the British empire, or the US empire, again we see that either these powers are also guilty of seeking to completely re-write the international system, or your argument is flawed. Both the US and the UK held onto their overseas possessions by force, in the last resort. Yes, I recognise the profound differences between the British and Nazi empires in terms of outlook, aims and impact on the subject peoples, but this does not alter the basic facts of the case.

You might, for the sake of argument, be better off pursuing the idea that Germany undermined the international system of states because of the hopelessly chaotic administrative structure that Hitler created, in which the Nazi party, the civilian government, the Wehrmacht and the SS all fought for power and influence. By 1945, the SS was practically a state-within-a-state. But this was an accident brought about by HItler's internal divide-and-rule policy, and was by no means an intentional outcome.

[jollytiddlywink]

I think you an incredibly Eurocentric viewpoint.

Indeed I do. Europe is at the centre of the west, and we are debating, ultimately, the idea of western decline. So, in this case, I see no problem with Eurocentrism, and think that, if anything, it helps to keep the arguments as clear as possible. (please note also my discussion of imperial and Japanese history in my last post)

[the Empress]

I've only glanced at your recent posts because they're quite hard to read (paragraphs guys). However, concentration on Europe: you don't have any robust theory of decline because you've excluded too many variables. That's naive. Also, Europe isn't the entirety of the west as dicussed previously. Again, the concetration on 20C military history, principally world wars which are quite unique (arguable WWI emerged from 19C issues anyway, and WWII emerged from a WWI mess) -> how can you extrapolate? You can't validate a theory from this, you need more information, and you need more variables -> particularly ones relevant to furture scenarios. Have you developed any?

I'm suprised you've studied colonial history, and still come at this issue from such a militaristic, European standpoint. Surely you've been introduced to literature which discusses the concepts you're missing, such as the exclusion of knowledge from and relevance of other cultures and systems . . . . .

[jollytiddlywink]

I've only glanced at your recent posts because they're quite hard to read (paragraphs guys). However, concentration on Europe: you don't have any robust theory of decline because you've excluded too many variables. That's naive. Also, Europe isn't the entirety of the west as dicussed previously. Again, the concetration on 20C military history, principally world wars which are quite unique (arguable WWI emerged from 19C issues anyway, and WWII emerged from a WWI mess) -> how can you extrapolate? You can't validate a theory from this, you need more information, and you need more variables -> particularly ones relevant to furture scenarios. Have you developed any?

I'm suprised you've studied colonial history, and still come at this issue from such a militaristic, European standpoint. Surely you've been introduced to literature which discusses the concepts you're missing, such as the exclusion of knowledge from and relevance of other cultures and systems . . . . .

Europe may not be the entirety of the west, as previously discussed (in fact, if you look back through all the posts, you will find that I am the only person who has attempted to define what they mean by 'the west' and which countries are included in it), but no definition of the west has ever excluded Europe. Thus it is the unchanging central feature of the west, even if it isn't always the entirety of the west, so surely a lack of focus on Europe would, in fact, introduce too many variables. I don't necessarily need a theory of decline because I am arguing that the west is not in decline, and LP's theory of decline seems perfectly robust to me (even if I disagree with it).

I am not extrapolating anything about the decline or otherwise of the west from the wars of the 20th century: that is part of a side-debate about the nature of the Second World War. Once that debate is settled, then we will begin to extrapolate from that conclusion.

With regard to "other variables", have you noticed that LP and I have engaged extensively with issues of international law, economics, IR theory, humanitarianism, and Africa (to name a few of the non-military and non-European topics under discussion)?

Surely the "relevance of other cultures and systems" is a matter of irrelevance, because unless I am very much mistaken, the political organisation of the world today is very much in a western image. Other cultures and systems only become relevant if we conclude that the west is indeed in decline, and that is is going to be replaced by something non-western. Only then, when the debate moves to a discussion of what will rise to prominence following the decline of the west, would it be relevant to consider other systems. Indeed, LP has already made a convincing effort at charting out possible future systems to replace the Westphalian system.

Lastly, your insistence on neatly-formatted paragraphs might be better received if you spelt it correctly.

[LonelyPilgrim]

I've only glanced at your recent posts because they're quite hard to read (paragraphs guys). However, concentration on Europe: you don't have any robust theory of decline because you've excluded too many variables. That's naive. Also, Europe isn't the entirety of the west as dicussed previously. Again, the concetration on 20C military history, principally world wars which are quite unique (arguable WWI emerged from 19C issues anyway, and WWII emerged from a WWI mess) -> how can you extrapolate? You can't validate a theory from this, you need more information, and you need more variables -> particularly ones relevant to furture scenarios. Have you developed any?

I'm suprised you've studied colonial history, and still come at this issue from such a militaristic, European standpoint. Surely you've been introduced to literature which discusses the concepts you're missing, such as the exclusion of knowledge from and relevance of other cultures and systems . . . . .

Empress... I genuinely mean no offense, but you should go back and read the discussion in more detail. As jollytiddlywink points out, we've covered non-European issues. In fact, the keystone of my argument, as I see it, lies in the economic interdependence between the 'West' and the developing world, particularly Africa, and that instability and the failures of the state system in the developing world is the wellspring of change in the Westphalian system. I'm not sure how less Euro-centric that could be.

jollytiddlywink doesn't feel that instability in Africa or the rest of the developing world threatens the system and doesn't see decline as likely or happening. (Is that fair jtw? I don't want to oversimplify or mischaracterise.)

I think we do have a problem in that we haven't defined what a Western decline means or looks like. For my case, I'm arguing a slightly different point: the imminent collapse of the international state system of sovereignty and its replacement by some other organising or normative principle - I take it ipso facto that such a change would lead to a decline in the West, but I haven't defined what that decline would be other than a drop in living standards because I do think there are too many variables to predict the degree or nature of decline and no reason to believe the effect would be homogeneous among nations.

[the Empress]

Lastly, your insistence on neatly-formatted paragraphs might be better received if you spelt it correctly.

Since you actually quoted my correct spelling I don't get where that came from. It's not even an objection to a long post, it's just hard to read block text. Pretty reasonable.

Variables: agriculture, climate, culture etc. There's a huge focus on military matters on this thread, and I don't think that's the be-all. You've admitted a Eurocentric viewpoint *shrug*

[Frank]

As somewhat of a lay-thinker on these matters, it strikes me that Jollytiddlywinks' stance really isn't untenable. There are inherent oversights and neglects in the argument, but when constructing a model as has been going on in this thread, I think we're surely better working towards an all-encompassing model rather than demanding one from the outset.

Which is to say: even if there were an issue with Eurocentricity or over-emphasis of military matters (which, on reading, I sincerely don't think there has been), it's still a productive line of thought. Not all of the variables will be necessarily important. Indeed someone we think would be important might be unimportant and one's we traditionally overlook might well be significant; it's surely the 'job' (well: interest) of whoever's thinking about this stuff to make an effort at discerning between them.

For now though, I'm quite enthralled by the discussion and have little to add to any of the specific points. There is one claim, however, I'd query for more details on the thinking:

Jollytiddlywink: If my memory serves, you've iterated that you expect the West to decline 'relative' to the massing power of those eastern powers of India and China, for example, (and, were we to be particularly surprised, any particular odd power blocks forming in Africa or South America) but not to decline 'overall'. Obviously the question is along the lines of "Surely that's still a decline?", but I think the more interesting course would be to just discuss the idea in a bit more detail. Any thoughts?

[the Empress]

OK I've gone through some of the recent posts a bit more, and erm, as some of them are a bit long I'm going to check I've got the gist (and in case anyone else is lost).

RECENT: LP is arguing that late 19C-20C empires were attempting to change the international system and exert racial hegemony? And JTW is saying this is untrue.

SIDE-NOTE: I noticed a comment in there about the British Empire fighting to retain it's possessions. The British Empire was a fairly unique entity; there are examples such as Fiji where the Brits specifically preserved native laws and land holdings. In India the Empire created a mishmash of Indian and British law. The British Empire was quite diverse in its approaches and historically expanded somewhat haphazardly (lacked central direction). So, its definately not comparable to German empiric aspirations. Indeed, if I recall correctly, overtures were made to Germany with respect to colonial possessions (Britain was willing to negotiate), but Germany was not interested in overseas expansion in this sense by WWI & WWII (although it did attempt to participate in the scramble for Africa prior to this).

EUROCENTRICITY: To clarify: Eurocentricity - it seems that the modern European state is being used as a point of reference; I think this is too rigid and assumes that this is the only legitimate condition. This relates specifially to the post which asked what other states existed pre-1900. It may not be relevant to the discussions that I've rescrolled through, but, I think it's a valid reminder that that assumption is Eurocentric, and excludes what may be valuable data. With respect to military preoccupation, the total war discussion which expanded (by consensus). Um, clearer?

MISSING VARIABLE: climate change (poss. reordering world relations)--> a 21st C issue.

WESTPHALIAN SYSTEM: The Peace of Westphalia 1648 : [POSSIBLY] ended attempts at the imposition of any supranational authority on European states. forcible intervention by one country in the domestic affairs of another was less frequent in the period between 1850 and 1900 than in most previous and subsequent periods (Leurdijk 1986).

WPS PRINCIPLES:
1. sovereignty of states and the fundamental right of political self determination
2. (legal) equality between states
3. principle of non-intervention of one state in the internal affairs of another state